Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

Brigham B. Harvey and Ruth M. Harvey v. Haights
Bench Irrigation Co. : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Harvey v. Haights Bench Irrigation Co., No. 8631 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2767

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
Q~F T'HE STATE OF UTAH

FILED
BRIGHAM B. HARVEY and
RUTH ·M. HARVEY,
Plalintiffs (Jffbd Respondents·;··----

JUL 1- 1957

--i~;k~--5~;;;~-;:;,-~--c~~ri:··u"t;;;-~

Case No.

-vs.-

HAIGHTS BENCH IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellrunt.

8631

Respondents' Brief

EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................

1

ARGUMENT ······························-----------------------------------------------------···········

9

CROSS-APPEAL -----------------·········--------------------------------------····-·················

15

CASES CITED
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109 Utah 197,
159 P. 2d 596. (Rehearing) 109 Utah 213, 174 P. 2d
148 ·-······················-·-····-··············--------·······-·····-···············-9, 10, 13, 14, 15
Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 311.................................................. 16
Nielsen v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 696................................

18

Robin v. Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d 340........................................

20

Smith v. Rock Creek Water Corp., (Cal.) 208 P. 2d 705..................

17

Stephens Ranch v. Union Pacific Railroad, 48 Utah 528,
161 p. 459 -----------------------------------------------------·······································

20

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
Q~F THE STATE Q~p UTAH
BRIGHAM B. HARVEY and
RUTH M. HARVEY,
Plaintiffs arnd Respondents,
-vs.HAIGHTS BENCH IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant a;nd Appellant.

Case No.

8631

Respondents' Brief
The Statement of Facts by Appellant is not acceptable. The case was tried to a jury. The conflicts in the
evidence were resolved in our favor, and on appeal we
are entitled to have the court accept as the facts the
view of the evidence most favorable to our position.
We, accordingly, believe that a further statement of
facts is necessary.
STATEJYIENT OF FACTS
Respondents are the owners of a tract of real property, whi,ch is situated about one-half mile easterly from
the oiled highway north of Farmington, (R. 45). Prior
1
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to the times herein complained of, the Weber Basin
Conservancy District had commenced the construction
of an aqueduct to bring water to this area. Respondents
had subscribed to 100 acre feet of water, and the water
will be delivered to the land in a pipeline under pressure
above the land to the east, so that the water will flow to
the land under pressure, (R. 64). The land is presently
uncultivated, but is used for livestock grazing purposes.
It had a value at the times material hereto of $1,000.00
an acre, (R. 64 and 108). The development of the area
does not make the land immediately usable for subdivision purposes, and if it were now ready for subdivision,
it would have a higher value, (R. 104).
An expert called by the defendants testified that
the land was worth $100.00 per acre for strictly agricultural uses, (R. 150). He was unable to express any
opinion as to '"·hether the changes made by the appellant
to the ditch and surrounding land had diminished its
Yalue for that purpose, (R.. 151). ~Ir. Harvey, one of
the respondents, testified that it (the work of appellant)
had rPduced the YahH-., (R. 65) as did ~Ir. Horace Beesley,
a rPal estate agent called by respondents, (R. 105). Thus,
there is affirmatiYe evidence from t\YO different witTI(lSS(\s that t hP laud value ha ~ been reduced, and there
is no 'vitn('ss \vho testified to the contrary.
It \vas admittt)d that appellant owns a prescriptive
ri•rht. to mnintain n. canal aeross the ahoYe described
land. Thn eanul \\·as used to transport ·w..ater from Farming1on (~anyon. Watt)r from this source is only available
until about the 4th of July, (R. 46). From the 4th of
.~
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July on through at least until late Fall, no water was
transported in the canal, ( R. 156).
In its condition prior to the work done by appellant,
livestock could readily cross the canal. The canal was
an average of eight feet wide, and the banks were
sloping. At high water the flow was about two feet deep,
(R. 54). There was no danger to livestock.
In the fall of 1955, appellant, for the purpose of
waterproofing the ditch, entered upon the lands of the
respondents. They took a bulldozer down the east bank
and pushed over numerous large oak trees and cottonwood trees and left the debris where it fell, (R. 48). In
maintaining the canal through the prescriptive period,
appellant had never occupied the east bank of the canal
for any purposes. The trees which were pushed over
and destroyed on the east bank had for fifty years been
undisturbed, (R. 49, 72). The oaks were up to six inches
in diameter, (R. 48). There were only two places along
the entire east bank through plaintiffs' property where
the work was done that it was even possible, prior to
the work done and herein complained of, for a team of
horses to get out on the east side of the canal, (R. 168).
There previously had been piled on the west bank
sand and gravel and silt from the cleaning of the canal.
The bank was not in a condition where motor vehicles
could have gone along it, (R. 180 & 49 & 59). Appellant
levelled off the west bank and constructed a road along
it, the excess dirt was sloughed off the bulldozer blade
to the west, leaving an area which was cleared of trees
3
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by the bulldozer up to approximately 45 feet wide, including the width of the canal, (R. 50). After so clearing
both sides of the canal of trees and after constructing a
road where none had theretofore existed, appellant installed a concrete ditch, which is seven feet wide across
the top, fourteen inches wide across the bottom and
thirty-six inches deep, (R. 57).
Before doing the work, one of the officers of appellant went to the wife of Mr. Harvey and told her that
they wanted to do some work on the ditch, (R. 197). He
did not tell her that they were going to cement it, (R.
197). He did not tell her that they were going to build
a. road, nor destroy the trees, or any of the details of
the work, (R. 198). He did not even tell her the work
was going to be done on respondents' property, (R. 198),
nor did he get permission from respondents to do the
work which was done.
Thereafter, Mr. Harv~y saw appellant's employees
\vorking. He complained concerning the construction of
the ditch at that time. He later met the President of the
appellant company before the cement ditch was installed,
and requested that the appellant not install that type
of ditch, (R. 59). The President said that he would take
it up with the Board, (R. 60). Mr. Harvey then met with
the Board and told them he objected to the type of ditch
being constructed, and again requested them not to
proceed, (R. 60}. The Board refused his request, and
indicated that they were going to go forward with their
program, (R. 60). Mr. Harvey then retained counsel,
who in writing advised the appellant company not to
4
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proceed, (R. 61). Nevertheless, the company ignored the
wishes of the plaintiff. Over his repeated objection, they
installed the cement ditch described above, left the debris
scattered along his land (R. 48 and 74), and left him no
crossing across the canal, (R. 75).
As to the type of ditch construction, it is readily
admitted by everyone that it would be almost impossible
for livestock to cross it. The sloping sides, the narrow
bottom, and the 36 inch depth, coupled with the 7 foot
top width, make it dangerous. The cement ditch extends
beyond the property of the plaintiff on the north, leaving
him no way to get around the ditch to the north without
going off his own land, (R. 173). The ditch is 750 feet
long, and in this 750 foot length there is no way to cross
it, (R. 173). Livestock would be endangered if they tried
to drink from the canal. Even large animals like horses
would not voluntarily have crossed the ditch, so that it
effectively cut the land in two, (R. 62).
The engineer called by respondents testified that he
would not have recommended that type of ditch for this
land, (R. 94). While this type might be slightly cheaper,
he said the difference in cost would have been very
slight, (R. 85-86). A ditch design with a wider bottom
and without so much depth would have accommodated
every problem of the irrigation company equally as well
as would this one. The difference in cost was practically
nil, (R. 85-86). When the ditch was full, evaporation
losses would have been less with a square-type ditch,
because with a wider bottom, the top surface (from
which evaporation took place) would have been nar-

5
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rower. There is now no practical way for the plaintiffs
to overcome the damage that has been done. To cover
the ditch now would cost approximately $10,000.00, (R.
137). He could establish a crossing through construction
of bridges and he could, of course, clean up the debris
they left on his land, but he can't overcome the danger
to livestock, and, of course, it would take 50 years to
regrow the trees to the size they were when they were
destroyed, (R. 72).
Engineers were called by appellant to testify that
the ditch constructed was the most efficient, but when
they were asked to define what they meant by "efficient",
they said it meant only that it was the cheapest, (R. 134,
138, 118). There was testimony to the effect that the
Government would not participate in the cost under its
various agricultural programs unless this type of ditch
was constructed, but on cross-examination the witnesses
admitted that the Government had a short time before
participated in the cost of a wider and shallower section
of ditch on this same canal, and that the Government
approval probably could have been had, (R. 137). In
any event, the testimony from appellant's engineers to
the extent it conflicts with the testimony of Engineer
Kelly, must be disregarded, because the jury found the
issues in favor of the plaintiffs. Engineer Kelly was
definite and unequivocal. He stated that there is no consideration which would have justified this type of design
through this type of land. A shallower, wider ditch
(wider at the bottom) could have been constructed at
substantially the same cost, (R. 97). It would not have
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been so <langerous, ( R. 89). The evaporation losses
would have been about the same, (R. 97), and the type
of design chosen must, under the findings of the jury,
be accepted as being more hazardous to livestock, impractical to cross, more dangerous to children, and it
decreased the value of plaintiffs' land. In this regard
it should be noted that the jury allowed only $400.00
actual damage for (1) reduced land value; (2) the
damage caused by the leaving of no practical means of
crossing the canal; (3) leaving to the plaintiffs also the
expense of cleaning up the debris; and ( 4) the destruc.tion of the trees and the building of a road. Certainly
these factors would more than justify the $400.00 award.
The evidence shows, without dispute, that appellant
has taken more land in the doing of the work complained
of here than it has ever before used. It never used any
part of the east bank. The trees grew down to the water
line. The oak trees were five to six inches in diameter
and were about 50 years old. Even teams of horses could
not get out of the canal on that side except at two points,
(R. 190). The taking of the strip of land down the east
bank as shown by the pictures and described by the
witnesses, is clearly the taking of land never before used
by appellant. On the west bank they have constructed
a road that theretofore never existed, (R. 185 and 181).
They have widened an area occupied. They have also
destroyed the trees along the west bank, (R. 182). The
evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that previous to
this time the canal was cleaned first by putting teams
of horses in the bottom of the canal and scraping the

7
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silt on to the west bank. In more recent times it has
been cleaned by putting tractors in the bottom of the
canal, lifting the debris out with a front-end loader and
depositing it on the bank, (R. 190). Members of the
public on occasion have gone with wagons and hauled
this sand and gravel away, but the irrigation company
has not done so, (R. 189-190), and there was no road
or defined wheel track along the bank and this loading
was only at the south end, (R. 49, 181, 185).
What this court must decide on this appeal Is
whether under the laws of the State of Utah the owner
of a prescriptive right of way for a canal can, in order
to waterproof it, (a) select the cheapest possible design
over the protest of the landowner, where another design
nearly as cheap and equally as efficient would remove
much of the inconvenience and damage to the landowner ;
(b) whether in waterproofing a canal the owner of a
prescriptive right of way can destroy trees which have
existed along the bank for 50 years; (c) \Yhether an
8 foot wide canal, which historically has been maintained
by operating equipment in the canal can be changed so
as to occupy a strip of ground 45 feet wide; ( 5) whether
without the landowner's permission, and over his protest
the owner of a prescriptive easeme11t can construct a
roadway along the banks of the canal; (e) and whether
in waterproofing a canal, the owner of the prescriptive
right can in addition to pushing over the trees, leave the
debris therefrom scattered hither and yon across the
land of the servient tenant, and (f) construct a ditch, so
designed that it effectively cuts the land in two and leaves
8
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him no crossings. If all of these things can be done
without liability, then, indeed, the entire concept of
private property must completely prostitute itself to the
convenience of the owner of a prescriptive way.
ARGUMENT
The trial court endeavored to follow the principles
pronounced in Big Cottonwood Tam;n.er Ditch Co. v.
JJ!l oyle, 109 Utah 213, 17 4 P. 2d 148. The instructions
given to the jury as to the rights of the prescriptive
owner were taken almost verbatim from that case. When
the Moyle case was first argued, the Supreme Court held
that where a prescriptive easement confers an incidental
benefit on the servient estate, the benefit cannot be taken
away without giving up the easement. See Big Cottonwood Tanrner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109 Utah 197, 159 P.
2d 596.
A petition for rehearing was filed and joined in by
numerous irrigation companies. They argued that if in
order to waterproof a ditch it was necessary to start
from scratch and condemn an entirely new easement,
waterproofing would become so expensive as to be impossible. The court granted a rehearing and permitted
the pendulum to swing entirely to the opposite side, and
while only one other judge concurred with the rationale
of the author judge, the majority of the court has apparently held that there is a right to enlarge the burden
on the servient estate under certain conditions. We feel
that this holding violates the due process clauses of the
State and Federal Constitutions, and takes private
9
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property for public use without compensation. We will
argue this in detail under the section entitled CrossAppeal.
The Supreme Court in the Moyle case, however, did
not hold that the owner of the prescriptive right of way
had the unbridled right to do as it pleased on the land
of the servient estate. The right to waterproof a ditch
could increase the burden on the servient estate only
under the following conditions, which are reflected 111
the following quotations from the JJ!l oyle case :
''It follows that under the common law of this
state and under the circumstances of the prescriptive user in this case the easement acquired by
plaintiff was for the purpose of carrying irrigation water in ditches across the lands of defendants and included among other things the right, in
the interests of water conservation, to improve
the method of carrying said irrigation water and
the right of entry to effect said improvements.
''Though the right to improve the ditches in
the interests of water conservation is mthin the
easement the irrigation company has across defendants' land it does not follow the company can
exercise that right in any manner it sees fit.
''The rights of the dominant owner are limited
by the rights of the servient O\Yner. Pioneer Irrigation District v. Smith, 48 Idaho 734, 285 P. 474.
Each owner must exercise his rights so as not
unreasonably to interfere \Yith the other.''

"* * * Defendants haYe

legal grounds of
complaint if additional burdens are cast on their
estate by plaintiff's exercise of the right, included
in its easement, to improve the ditches so long as
that right is reasonably exercised.
110

10
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''What is a reasonable manner for the company to improve a particular ditch is a question
of fact to be decided after considering location of
the ditch, the type and use of the property through
\vhich it flows, the amount of water it carries, the
relative cost of the possible methods of waterproofing and all other facts and circumstances
bearing on the question.'' * * *
"It may be the cheapest method for the company to improve its ditch would be an unreasonable method because it would unnecessarily injure
the servient owner. It may be that the equities of
the case require a slightly less efficient means of
conservation in order to prevent unnecessary injury to the land owners. For example, in a narrow
deep ditch less water would be lost due to evaporation than in a wider shallower ditch carrying the
same amount of water; yet it may be that the
damage to the servient owner from having a
narrow, deep ditch over his property would be so
much greater than from having a wider shallower
ditch that it would be reasonable to allow only
the less efficient improvement. On the other hand,
the irrigation company should not be required to
use a very expensive or unusual method merely
because of a whim of the land owner or because
the use of said method would be slightly less burdensome to the servient estate. The equities must
be weighed. Each case must be decided on its own
particular facts. In no case would the easement
owner be allowed in improving his ditch to take
more or different land from the servient estate
than that used during the prescriptive period.''
* * *

"* * * In the case at bar, for the servient
owners to have shown the method proposed unreasonable because it would cause unnecessary
damage they would have had to show that another
11
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method available for use would cause substantially less damage. This the owners have not
done. As far as the record reveals, there is only
one method of improvement practicably available
to the irrigation company and that is the apparently reasonable method proposed by it. If other
methods for waterproofing and shaping the
ditches were practicably available to the irrigation company, which would effect the water conservation and would be materially less injurious
to the servient estates, the servient owners should
ha v.e revealed them. ' ' * * *
''This opinion is in nowise a determination
that the method of improving its ditches proposed
by the irrigation company is under all the circumstances of this case a reasonable method and that
it will cause no unnecessary damage to the servient
estates. Our holding is that the servant owners
filed in the court below to prove such method is
unreasonable and they therefore were not entitled
to have the irrigation company restrained from
putting that method into effect.''
The evidence here shows that these conditions have
been violated by appellant. One condition is that the
owner of the prescriptive easement may not utilize more
land than was used during the prescriptive period.
There is no dispute in the evidence, and even if there
were a dispute, the jury found the issues in our favor
to the effect that the irrigation company destroyed the
trees on a strip wide enough for a tractor down the
entire east bank of the canal which had never before
been occupied, (R. 49, 59). They destroyed the trees
thereon which theretofore had been undisturbed for fifty
years, (R. 54, 58). They built a road down the west side

12
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and pushed the bank debris outward, so that, with the
width of the canal, they are occupying a space nearly
45 feet, (R. 50), whereas, before the work was done the
canal was an average of about eight feet wide, (R. 45),
and they used the area on the south end to dump gravel
and silt cleaned from the canal. Thus, the Moyle case
held that appellant had no right to occupy more land
and the evidence here shows the appellant has done so.
The Moyle case also says that the waterproofing
procedures followed must be reasonable, and must not
unreasonably burden or inconvenience the servient
estate. The court left to the jury the problem of determining whether or not under all of the facts and circumstances here the methods were reasonable. The jury
found that they were not. The evidence which would
have permitted such a finding came from Mr. Kelly, an
engineer. He testified that this was not a proper design
for this area. He stated the advantages and disadvantages of this type of ditch. On the advantage side, the
only element was that it was a. cheap type of construction, but the difference in cost between this and a more
acceptable type ditch was slight, (R. 86). As disadvantages, Mr. Kelly noted the danger coming from such a
ditch; the inconvenience in crossing was noted by several
witnesses, (R. 89-90). We will not again detail the
evidence here. We submit that the jury was properly
permitted to determine whether or not the design chosen
was reasonable.
There is nothing in the Moyle case which would
permit the owner of the prescriptive right to construct

13
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a structure across the servient estate which could not
be crossed by livestock or vehicles. This is neither
necessary nor reasonable. The evidence is without dispute that they made no crossing for respondents and
that the structure they built cannot be crossed.
There is nothing in the Moyle case that says they
can push and destroy the trees that have grown up along
the banks, nor that once having pushed them over they
may leave the debris scattered haphazardly over the land
of the servient estate. The evidence is uncontradicted
that this is what they did in this case. We think on these
last two items the piling of debris upon our lands and
the construction of a ditch of this type which deprived
us of access from one tract to another, we are entitled
to a directed verdict, and that on these two items alone,
the verdict is, as a matter of law, inadequate.
It is perfectly all right for the law to develop along
lines which will permit the conservation of water, but
it is equally important, under our constitutional system
of government, that the concept of private property be
protected. The defendant constructed a dirt ditch across
our lands, occupying a strip some eight feet wide. This
did not disturb the growth of trees and shrubs through
the area. For more than fifty years the trees growing
along the banks were not disturbed. Appellant was able
to maintain and clean the canal by worki11g its equipment
in it. The servient estate holder was able to cross from
one side to the other at almost any point. There was no
particular danger to livestock left in the field. Yet
appellant here moved onto the land, over the plaintiffs'

14
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violent objections, and threats of suit, took a bulldozer
and pushed down their trees, cleared a strip up to 45
feet wide through the center of their land, left them the
debris, and no crossing. Appellant seeks here to make
them absorb the hazards of the canal and give up additional lands. Its sole justification for it is that this was
the cheapest way it could waterproof, and waterproofing
\Vas desirable. Certainly, the Moyle case does not contemplate that the only test of reasonableness is cheapness. Here appellant cannot even justify its actions on
that ground, because under competent and unequivocal
testimony, both from Mr. Kelly, our engineer, and Mr.
Austin, appellant's engineer, the difference in cost was
slight, (R. ______ ). The court properly instructed the jury
under the doctrine of the Moyle case, and most assuredly
the verdict for actual damages of only $400.00 is justified. Further, having given the plaintiff absolutely no
consideration while he was attending the appellant's
board meeting, and protesting its work, and threatening
suit, punitive damages were entirely justified, and again
the amount thereof was reasonable. If the Moyle case
correctly states the law, then we submit that this verdict
must be affirmed.
CROSS-APPEAL
We cross-appeal in this case, for two reasons:
1. We think the Moyle case goes too far and places
a greater burden on the servient estate than is necessary
to encourage the conservation of water.

15
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2. The evidence stands uncontradicted to the effect
that the defendant company intends to place water from
new sources in the ditch and to place it in the ditch when
it normally would have been dry. We deny that they
have an easement for so doing, and until they acquire
that easement, either by negotiation or by eminent
domain, we deny that they have any right to take any
water except under their water rights from Farmington
Canyon across our lands.
Our challenge to the Moyle case comes from the fact
that we believe that the court there went too far. We
do not contend for the original opinion. Where an easement for a ditch has been established by prescription,
we do not contend for a presumption or holding that the
servient estate was entitled to the seepage of water or
incidental benefits. We deny, however, that it is necessary to the conservation of water that the court swing
to the other extreme and hold that (1) the irrigation
company may maintain its present easement, but (2) it
may go further and enlarge the easement and increase
the burden without compensation. If the incidental
benefit of seepage water is taken from the servient
estate by waterproofing, and the prescriptive easement
holder is upheld in its right to maintain the ditch, this
should be enough. When it wants to enlarge the burden,
it has the power of eminent domain. See N a.slz 'O. Clark,
27 Utah 158, 75 P. 311.
The measure of damages ought to be the difference
in the value of the land burdened with the ditch as it
was established by prescription, and without the benefits

16
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on the one hand, as against the value of the land with
the ditch as changed by the waterproofing. If there is a
detriment or a loss by reason of the changes, (waterproofing) upon what principles of morals or ethics ought
that loss or burden to be borne by the servient estate~
The benefits from the change redound entirely to the
owner of the easement. Why is it necessary in the development of water la'v and the conservation of water to
give to the dominant estate the benefits, and to require
the servient estate to stand the detriments~ If the dominant estate is permitted to maintain its prescriptive
easement, and is also permitted to take from the servient
estate holder, without compensation, any incidental benefit from the easement, we think the court goes far enough.
For the court to go one step further and hold that the
servient estate holder must bear, without compensation,
all of the increased burdens, makes the entire concept of
private property yield to the desire for conservation of
water. It is not unreasonable or burdensome to the
owner of the ditch to require the ditch owner, who gets
the benefit from the improvement, to stand the expense
of the burden. We thus ask the court to re-examine the
Moyle case, and contend that if the Moyle case is to be
followed, it will deprive the owner of a servient estate
of his property without due process of law.
The Utah law as pronounced in the Moyle case
•
stands alone. Other Western irrigation states have not
found it necessary to override the constitutional doctrine of private property, in order to permit reasonable
conservation of water. See for example, Sm.ith vs. Rock
Creek Water Corp., ______ (Cal.), 208 P. 2d 705.

17
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It is uncontraverted that the appellant has acquired
1300 acre feet of water under the Weber Basin Conservancy District Project, (R. 155) ; that it intends to put
that water into the canal which crosses Respondents'
lands, (R. 156). Previously only water from Farmington Canyon has been taken across our lands. At high
water this would be enough to fill the canal, but it would
gradually reduce to nothing by about the 4th of July,
(R. 156). The land thus was not burdened by any easement during July, August, September, etc. This does
not involve conservation of water. Appellant simply is
taking water from another water course and putting it
across our land. It has no easement to so do. It will keep
the canal nearly full all of the time, and will keep water
in the canal at times when none would be there. Fundamental concepts of due process should, and we think do,
prohibit this. We asked the trial court to so adjudge
and to prohibit the taking of the Weber Basin water
across our land until they had acquired the right to do
so. They do have the right of eminent domain. They
can take the water through us. The amount of damage
may not be great, but they simply don't have the right
to take their water through us from sources never before
used. We think the holding of Nielsen r. Sandberg, 105
Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 696, is in point. In that case, the court
said:
''The use during the prescriptive period is the
only indication of the nature and extent of the
right acquired (citing cases). The servient estate
can only be subjected to the easement to the
extent of which the easement was acquired, and
the easement owner cannot change this use so as
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to put any greater burden upon the servient
estate.''
The court then quotes with approval from ''Restatement of Property'' as follows :
''Thus a diversion of water for power purposes is not, ordinarily at least, justifiable under
an easement created by a diversion of water for
purposes of irrigation.''
The court goes on to say that the right cannot be
enlarged so as to place a greater burden on the servient
estate. The court then says at page 103:
''A right of way founded upon a deed or grant
is limited to the uses, and the extent thereof as
fixed by the grant or deed. If the easement is
based upon the reservation in the patent, it is
limited by the use and way of its exercise at the
time of the patent. That right was merely the
right to have water flow for power purposes, as
that was all the use made at the time of patent.
Of course, that right might be enlarged since
patent, by prescription, but in that event, the
claimant must stand on the prescription and the
grant will be presumed to have been released and
extinguished. Such prescriptive right would be
limited by the nature and extent of use during
the prescriptive period.''
Of course, in the Moyle case, supra, the author judge
uses language out of harmony with the language quoted
above. However, only one other judge concurred in the
primary opinion, and the extent to which the various
pronouncements of Mr. Justice Wolfe represent the
present law, we think must yet be determined. We have
no quarrel with the objective of conserving water and

19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

preventing waste. It is not necessary, however, to
destroy the whole concept of private property. If I had
a. water right for one cubic foot of water and would
burden your land by taking one foot across it, there just
isn't any authority under which I can enlarge it to two
feet or ten feet. In fact, there is considerable Utah
authority to the contrary. See, for example, Stephens
Ramch v. Union Pacific Railroad, 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac.
459; Robin v. Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d 340. Where
as here, the prescriptive easement is for water from
Farmington Canyon, which stays at high flow for a little
while and dwindles to nothing, it is clearly an enlargement to maintain the 30 foot flow by placing water from
other sources in the canal. It is also an enlargement to
use our lands after July 4th. This, I repeat, is not conservation of water. It is simply a situation where the
appellant having acquired a smaller right by prescription is endeavoring to take our land for its own benefit
without paying us for it.
We respectfully submit that the court should have
adjudged that we are entitled to an injunction against
the intended enlargement of the easement.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for Respondents
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